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COMMENTS
suggests the soundness of the Missouri and Florida decisions,29
i.e., one-half of the property should remain vested in the guilty
party and the other half should go to the heirs of the decedent.
A. E. S. SCHMID
PERSONAL PROPERTY-GIFT OF A FUR COAT REVOKED--CON-
TRACT FOR ITS SALE RESCINDED.
On April 4, 1947, donor and donee went into Saks's fur salon.
They looked over the selection of fur coats and finally found a
mink coat that donee liked. The price of the coat was $5,000.
Donor told the salesman that he wished to buy the coat for donee
but would pay no more than $4,000 for it.1 Saks rejected donor's
repeated offers of $4,000 for the coat. Donee wanted the coat
very much, and without donor's knowledge she went to Saks and
asked Saks to pretend to sell the coat to donor for $4,000, promis-
ing to pay the balance of $1,000 herself. Saks agreed and told
donor that they would sell the mink coat to him for $4,000. Donor
signed a sales slip believing that $4,000 was the full price of
the coat. He received the coat and then gave it to donee saying
that it was hers to keep. The following day donee returned to
Saks, paid the additional $1,000, and left the coat to be mono-
gramed. Later that day donor called Saks's and told them that
he had revoked the gift and would pay the $4,000 only if Saks
delivered the coat to him. At the time of the revocation donor
was unaware of any negotiations between Saks and donee and of
the fact that donee had paid $1,000 of the purchase price. A
series of suits followed. First, donee refused to accept the $1,000
reimbursement tendered by Saks, and sued Saks for the conver-
sion of the coat. Saks then filed a cross-bill against donor and
donee for the remaining $4,000 due on the coat and also a sep-
arate complaint against donor on the contract of sale between
donor and Saks. All of these actions and cross-bills were joined
in one suit.
On the basis of these facts the California Court of Appeals
found that the gift was complete, that donee should receive the
29. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Grose v. Holland,
357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948) ; Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913,
27 S.W.2d 757 (1980).
1. Earl v. Saks & Co., 226 P.2d 340 (Cal. 1951).
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coat and that donor was liable for the purchase price.2 The
Supreme Court of California reversed the decision, holding that
the sale and gift were induced by fraudulent misrepresentations
and could be rescinded by donor.3
POWER OF A DONOR TO REVOKE A GIFT
Except in the case of a basic mistake, once a gift inter vivos
has been perfected by sufficient delivery and acceptance, it can-
not be revoked unless the donor has been induced to make the
gift through fraud, duress or undue influence. 4 In Mott v. Iossa
a donor sought to have a conveyance to his stepson set aside
because he was falsely and fraudulently led to believe that donee's
mother, donor's wife, was a widow, when in fact she was still
married to her first husband, who was still alive. A New Jersey
equity court, in holding the gift valid, said that a gift may be set
aside for fraud of the donee or a third person, but that the fact
misrepresented must either affect the subject matter of the
gratuitous contract, or if it is a misrepresentation of an extra-
neous fact, the fact must be such that the gift would not have
been given except for the misrepresentation.
In Earl v. Saks the California court found that the donor could
revoke the gift because of the fraudulent misrepresentation.
The misrepresentation was not with regard to the subject matter,
but, rather, to an extraneous fact. The donor was falsely and
fraudulently led to believe that he was paying the full price of
the coat, when in fact his intended donee was paying $1,000 to-
ward the purchase price. There was uncontradicted evidence
presented by donor, that he would not have bought the coat and
made the gift, had he known that he was not paying the entire
price of the coat.
The decision of the Supreme Court of California in the Earl
case is probably justified on the basis of the doctrine set out in
Mott v. Iossa,6 that a gift may be set aside for fraud. In other
cases, even where the misrepresentation was innocent and un-
2. Earl v. Saks & Co., 210 P.2d 864 (Cal. App. 1949).
3. Earl v. Saks & Co., 226 P.2d 340 (Cal. 1951).
4. Mallet v. Hall, 129 Me. 148, 150 Atl. 531 (1930) ; Mott v. lossa, 119
N.J. Eq. 185, 181 Atl. 689 (Ch. 1936); In re Anderson's Estate, 157 Ore.
365, 71 P.2d 1013 (1937). See 28 C.J. 652 (1932). For basic mistake see
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 26 (1937).




intentional,7 or where the misrepresentation did not amount to
actual fraud,8 the courts have indicated that the misled donor
may revoke his gift. Because the case at hand consisted of an
intentional misrepresentation of a material fact, it is submitted
that the Supreme Court of California rightly decided that the
donor could rescind his gift to donee.
RIGHT OF A BUYER TO RESCIND A CONTRACT OF SALE
Since the question whether the gift induced by fraudulent
misrepresentations could be rescinded has been disposed of, the
only remaining question is whether the buyer could rescind the
contract of sale entered into with Saks.9 It is almost universally
accepted that a contract of sale may be avoided if it is induced
by fraud. However, the American courts are not in complete
agreement regarding the necessity of damages to entitle a per-
son to rescind a sale induced by fraudulent misrepresentation.
There are at least two divergent views.
One view, accepted by many states, is that in order to rescind
a contract for fraud there must be proof of actual damage just
as is required to maintain an action on a contract.0 In Mason v.
Madson," the Montana Supreme Court refused to allow a de-
ceived buyer to rescind his contract of sale because he received
the very thing for which he bargained, although deceived as to
the source of supply. The court said:
Courts of Equity, like courts of law do not concern them-
selves with wrongs which do not produce injury.12
In a leading Georgia case, Austell v. Rice,13 the court found
that there was deceit and intentional misrepresentation but no
actual pecuniary injury. The court held that fraud without an
7. Steffen v. Stahl, 273 S.W. 118 (Mo. App. 1925) (dicta).
8. In re Clark's Estate, 233 App. Div. 487, 253 N.Y. Supp. 524 (4th
Dept. 1931) (dicta).
9. Earl v. Saks is not a restitution case. The buyer had paid no money
and was seeking no restoration of any property. This case was decided
solely on the theory of rescission of an express contract, and there was no
question as to damages. See on question as to damages: McCleary, Damages
as Requisite to Rescission for Mispresentation, 36 MIcH. L. REv. (1937);
Notes, 48 HARV. L. REv. 480 (1935); 16 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1903); 60 U.
oF PA. L. Rv. 205 (1911); 106 A.L.R. 125 (1937).
10. See, for example, Hall v. Mitchell, 59 Cal. App. 743, 211 Pac. 853(1922); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Mason v. Madson, 90 Mont. 489,
4 P.2d 475 (1931).
11. 90 Mont. 489, 4 P.2d 475 (1931).
12. Id. at 500, 4 P.2d at 478.
13. 5 Ga. 472 (1848).
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injury will not sustain an action or a defense. Both of these cases
indicate that in order to maintain an action or defend against a
a claim on the grounds of fraud, there must be proof of actual
pecuniary damages.
Another group of cases has held that proof of actual pecuniary
damages is not necessary to rescind a contract for fraudulent
misrepresentation. In a New York case, Stuart v. Lester,14 a
seller represented to the buyer that he had never offered to sell
his farm for less than $8,500, when in fact he had offered it for
sale several times for $6,000. Allowing the buyer to rescind the
contract because of the intentional misrepresentation even though
no actual pecuniary damage was alleged or proved, the court said:
The rule that fraud without damages resulting therefrom
never gives a right of action in favor of a defrauded party,
applies to those cases where the injured party is seeking to
recover damages from the wrongdoer in an action on the
case ex delicto, as an indemnity against the injury which he
has sustained by reason of the fraud and has no just applica-
tion to a case like the one in hand, where the fraud is relied
on as a defense to the enforcement of an executory contract.
If the false statement relates to a material fact, the law im-
plies that the defrauded party has suffered an injury suffi-
cient to defeat recovery."5
In J. I. Threshing Mach. Co. v. Webb1 a salesman induced a
man to enter into a contract for sale of an automobile upon the
false and intentional representations by the salesman that the
car had been shown to the man's wife, that she had driven in it,
and asked the salesman to persuade her husband to buy it. The
salesman brought an action on the contract, and by way of de-
fense the defendant announced he was rescinding the contract
because of fraud. There was no allegation of pecuniary damage,
but a Texas appellate court allowed the deceived buyer to re-
scind the contract and declared:
Pecuniary damage is not necessary to entitle a person to
relief by way of rescission; but it is enough for him to show
that he has been induced by material, false, and fraudulent
misrepresentations to enter into the contract he would not
have entered into but for such representation.1
14. 49 Hun. 58, 1 N.Y. Supp. 699 (5th Dept. 1888).
15. Id. at 63, 1 N.Y. Supp. at 701.
16. 181 S.W. 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
17. J. I. Threshing Mach. Co. v. Webb, 181 S.W. 853, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915). Accord: Woods-Faulkner & Co. v. Michelson, 63 F.2d 569 (8th Cir.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/9
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The court went on to say that the law implies that the defrauded
party has suffered injury sufficient to defeat recovery.
In Krinsky v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co.,18 it was held that
in an action for rescission for misrepresentation a plaintiff is
not bound to show that pecuniary damage resulted from the
misrepresentation. It is sufficient that the plaintiff received
something different from that for which he contracted and that
plaintiff might not have accepted the property if the facts had
not been misrepresented to him. Another case implied that the
deceived buyer might rescind the contract even though the prop-
erty offered is of greater value than the thing contracted for, if
the contract was induced by fraudulent misrepresentations and
the buyer received something other than that for which he con-
tracted.1
The Restatement of Contracts is in accord with the view that
damages are not essential to rescind a contract for fraud. The
Restatement proposes:
No legal effect is caused by either fraudulent or other mis-
representation unless it induces affirmative or negative con-
duct but it is not necessary that misrepresentation should be
the only inducement for entering into a contract or for giving
a discharge in order to make the contract or discharge void-
able. It is enough that the misrepresentation is relied on as
an inducement. It is immaterial whether damage is caused.20
The view adopted by the Restatement, that damages are not
necessary to rescind a contract for fraud, seems to be the opinion
of a majority of the American courts today. Even in the states
which cling to the view that damages are necessary the courts
seem to go overboard to find damages. A view commonly adopted
by such courts is found in Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co.21
There the court said that some damage must be shown in an
1933) (Damage is not the gist of an action for rescission); Dunn v.
Stringer, 41 Cal. App. 2d 726, 107 P.2d 411 (1942) (in a suit for rescission
of a contract on the ground of fraud, the contract may be cancelled even in
the absence of actual pecuniary loss to plaintiff) ; Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn.
338, 53 Atl. 729 (1902); Fawkes v. Knapp, 138 Minn. 384, 165 N.W. 236(1917); Stillwell v. Rankin, 55 Mont. 130, 174 Pac. 186 (1918) (damages
exist wherever fraud has induced a transaction which otherwise would not
have occurred); Varden v. Rudolph, 145 N.Y. Supp. 55 (5th Dept. 1913);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 476, comment c (1932).
18. 163 Misc. 833, 298 N.Y. Supp. 31 (1st Dept. 1937).
19. Kirby v. Dean, 159 Minn. 451, 199 N.W. 174 (1924).
20. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 476, comment c (1932).
21. 113 Tex. 441, 258 S.W. 462 (1924).
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action to rescind a contract for fraud, but the damage need not
be a monetary loss. The defrauded party must merely show an
injury to his property rights or an assumption of legal liabilities
different from those contracted for, as distinguished from a mere
injury to his feelings.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Jakoway v. Proudfit,a
recognized that there were two views concerning the necessity
of damages to entitle a person to rescind a contract for inten-
tional misrepresentation. The Nebraska court contended that
these two views, although seemingly contradictory, were actually
;reconcilable. The court said that to rescind a contract of sale,
no actual damages need be shown if the buyer does not receive
the particular thing for which he contracted. Where the buyer
obtains the thing he has contracted for, he cannot rescind the
sale unless he has suffered actual damage as a result of the mis-
representation. Be this as it may, other states tend to follow
either the view requiring damages for rescission or the other
making damages immaterial.
In the states which follow the majority view, that damages
are unnecessary to rescind a contract of sale for fraudulent mis-
representations, the buyer under facts similar to the Earl case
would be allowed to rescind the sale. Those states requiring
damages probably would not allow a buyer to rescind. Even if
these latter states followed the view that mere injury to property
rights, as distinguished from injury to personal feelings, is
sufficient damages for rescission, the buyer still would not be
able to rescind the sale. Here, the buyer received the coat he
bargained for, a coat worth $5,000, for which he paid only $4,000.
It seems that the only real damage was an injury to the buyer's
personal feelings, which would not be sufficient to satisfy the
damage requirement. Therefore, in states which require some
damage to entitle a buyer to rescind a sale, the buyer's defense
in Earl v. Saks would not be allowed. 23
22. 76 Neb. 62, 109 N.W. 388 (1906).
23. In Earl v. Saks & Co. the buyer was a defendant and was setting up
fraud as a defense. The question might arise in other cases whether or not
there is any distinction between using fraudulent misrepresentations in an
affirmative action of rescission and merely setting up fraud as a defense;
in other words can fraudulent misrepresentations without actual damages
be used as a shield, but not as a sword. There should be no distinction
between the two. The theory upon which both pleadings rest is identical.
Both rely upon the fact that the defrauded party is not trying to recover
any money damages or even to get restitution here. Instead the defrauded
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss4/9
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In Nebraska the buyer probably would not be able to rescind
the contract of sale with Saks because he did obtain the thing
for which he contracted, and could not show pecuniary damage,
an essential element when the misrepresentation concerns an
extraneous fact about something other than the article to be sold.
The holding in the instant case that no showing of pecuniary
damage is necessary to rescind a transaction for fraudulent
misrepresentation is in accord with the majority of American
decisions. However, it is possible that neither the majority nor
minority view ought to be applied uncritically in all cases. There
are a great many policy considerations, not yet well defined by
the courts, which should be extremely influential in helping the
courts decide to allow or deny rescission. In the present case
the donor was completely innocent, intentionally defrauded, and
induced by the fraudulent misrepresentations to make a gift. In
allowing the defrauded donor to rescind, the court was perhaps
strongly influenced by the bad faith of Saks, a store with sup-
posedly high integrity. Stronger and more definite policy con-
siderations might govern other cases.24
RONALD CUPPLES
REAL PROPERTY-"To MY WIFE So LONG As SHE MAY REMAIN
MY WIDOW"-ETERMINABLE FEE OR LIFE ESTATE?
Plaintiff's father devised to his wife his ". . . entire estate
both real and personal.., to have as long as she may remain my
widow, in case my widow should remarry it is my will that she
receive her lawful portion the same as if this will had never been
written." The widow died testate without having remarried.
She bequeathed the sum of $100 to plaintiff and the residue of
her estate to her other children, defendants, equally. Plaintiff
party merely wants to be relieved of his contractual obligations and should
not be denied relief because he has not incurred damages.
24. For example, in Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn. 338, 53 AtI. 729 (1902),
plaintiff, who had sold his land to defendant as the result of fraudulent
misrepresentations that the sale was to another person, was allowed to re-
scind. The defendant proposed to operate a boarding house, and the plaintiff
had an understanding with his neighbors that none of them would sell for
this purpose. Here the property of the plaintiff's neighbors might have been
depreciated leaving them without a right to sue anyone, and the plaintiff
might at the same time have suffered in their esteem, although he had
actually done his best to observe their agreement. It is submitted that the
policy considerations in favor of allowing relief in this case are far stronger
than they are in the principal case.
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